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Relaxing the EU’s Common Position on Cuba would allow




Since 1996, the EU’s Common Position on Cuba has made relations with the country contingent on
democratic reforms. William M. LeoGrande assesses whether the EU’s current approach requires
updating in light of recent developments within Cuba. He writes that with the United States’
influence undermined by years of hostile policies toward the country, a more conciliatory approach
could allow Europe to play a central role in influencing Cuba’s future direction.
The visit of Dutch Foreign Minister Frans Timmermans to Cuba earlier this month marks yet another
crack in the European’s Union’s 1996 Common Position on Cuba, which conditions normal
relations with the island on democratic reforms. “I think it is time for Europe to revise its position on
Cuba,” Timmermans said after signing a new bilateral cooperation agreement with Havana. “I think dialogue is a
better way than turning our backs to each other.” Days later, EU Commission President José Manuel Barroso
acknowledged that a number of member states were pressing for a reevaluation of the Common Position, and
Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel García Margallo announced that the issue would be taken up at the EU
foreign ministers meeting on 10 February. He added, however, that any new policy, “would have, as a determining
factor, respect for human rights.”
Since the 1970s, most European states have had a much
less hostile relationship with Cuba than the United States has
had. But the European Union’s Common Position has much
in common with the U.S. Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act of 1996 (also known as Helms-Burton, after its
Congressional sponsors). Both were adopted in reaction to
Cuba’s shoot-down of two small civilian aircraft piloted by
Cuban Americans, at a time when the regime was cracking
down on dissent. Both make the normalisation of relations
contingent on Cuban domestic political concessions. Both
have therefore been adamantly rejected by Cuba as
interference in its internal affairs. And both severely constrain
the ability of Washington and Brussels to respond creatively
to rapidly changing conditions in Cuba today.
To lift the conditionality imposed by Helms-Burton would
require that Congress amend the law – something
conservative Republicans would certainly block. Amending
the Common Position will require unanimity among the EU’s
member states, something conservative governments –
especially in the former socialist countries – have thus far blocked.
To escape the policy straight-jacket imposed by this legislation, individual European governments have responded
in ways much like U.S. presidential administrations. In Washington, President Obama has chipped away at
sanctions against Cuba by using his licensing power to authorise greater engagement. Similarly, various European
governments have expanded their bilateral economic and political ties with Cuba, despite the Common Position’s
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strictures. Trade between Cuba and Europe, at 2.5 billion euros annually, has roughly tripled in the years since the
Common Position was adopted, and official development assistance to Cuba has quadrupled to nearly 60 million
euros annually.
The argument against the Common Position is essentially the same as the argument against the U.S. embargo:
sanctions on Cuba have not worked. Making normal relations contingent on domestic political change has only
inflamed Cuba’s strong sense of nationalism. Having achieved independence late and then fallen under the tutelage
of the United States for half a century, Cuba does not respond well to foreign demands – in fact it defiantly
repudiates them, sometimes even acting against its own self-interest.
As Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez once explained to U.S. diplomats, “The pride of small countries,
which can even push them to make the wrong decision at times, and their feelings of dignity and sensitivity must be
borne in mind.” Cuba, however, is not indifferent to its international environment. Historically, Cuban leaders have
made adjustments, even on sensitive domestic issues like human rights, when those actions served its interests, so
long as the decisions could not be perceived as yielding to foreign pressure.
As a result, policies of engagement have proven more successful than policies of hostility and confrontation. In
2010, quiet diplomacy by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s government enabled Spain to play a crucial mediating
role between the Cuban government and the Catholic Church, leading to the release of more than a hundred
political prisoners – the largest such release since the 1970s. One reason Spain was able to play this role was
because, as EU president, Spain had pushed for a change in the Common Position, thereby earning Cuba’s
gratitude and enhancing Madrid’s influence.
Outside the EU, the government of Norway, neither bound nor burdened by the Common Position, has been able to
advocate for human rights and quietly support Cuban dissidents without incurring the wrath of the Cuban
government that EU members have suffered for similar actions. The difference is that Norway has no public policy
excoriating Cuban human rights practices or making bilateral relations contingent on them.
In practical terms, replacing the Common Position with an agreement on political and economic cooperation would
mean an increase in economic ties, including trade, aid, and direct foreign investment (FDI). To date, investment has
been limited not only by the EU’s rocky relations with Cuba, but also by the difficulty investors face working through
Cuba’s bureaucratic morass and the political uncertainty created by Cuba’s ambivalence toward FDI. That may be
changing, however, as part of Raúl Castro’s programme of economic “updating.” A new FDI law is scheduled to be
unveiled in March.
On the political front, replacing the Common Position does not mean that European states, individually or
collectively, would need to abandon their commitment to encouraging greater human rights and democracy in Cuba.
A warmer political climate would enable EU member states to express their concerns more effectively through quiet
diplomacy. What offends Cuba’s leaders is not that other states have different views on these issues; it is that the
Common Position makes normal relations contingent on Cuba conforming to European norms, a litmus test that no
other Latin American country is required to pass.
Cuba today is moving in directions that the EU has long favoured. The “updating” of the Cuban economic model,
begun in 2011, entails greater economic openness, reduced government regulation of private markets, and a larger
role for private sector businesses. At the same time, there has been a very gradual opening of political space to
debate the shape of Cuba’s future. Challenging Cuba’s one-party system or its socialist society is still out of bounds
– although the meaning of socialism is itself undergoing an evolution from the hyper-centralised Soviet model of
pervasive state control to something that looks much more like the market socialism of China and Vietnam.
Cuba harbours less suspicion of European states than it does of the United States simply because U.S. dominance
is more fresh in memory than Spanish colonialism. With Washington still sidelined by its antiquated policy of hostility
and embargo, an engaged Europe can play a central role influencing the direction of Cuba’s contemporary
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evolution, both political and economic. But that influence will come not from imposing conditions or making
demands. Rather it will come from creating an international environment that gives incentives for Cuba to continue
evolving in a positive direction, making Cuban interests and European interests ever more coincident.
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